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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Courts in the European Union (EU) have long held that the individual 
rights to privacy and data protection are fundamental rights.1  Nonetheless, 
recent cases before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and 
the national courts of some member states presented questions of exactly 
how far these rights may extend.2  In Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española 
de Protección de Datos, the CJEU held for the first time that EU citizens 
have a right to be forgotten.3  Scholars have generally defined the right to be 
forgotten as an individual’s right to remove or restrict the public’s access to 
that individual’s personal information on the internet.4  With this decision, 
the CJEU imposed a duty upon search engine operators to protect EU 
citizens’ personal information.  Those operators must now honor requests to 
remove information from the list of results displayed when an individual’s 
name is entered into the search engine.5  Such a decision has far-reaching 
implications for other fundamental rights recognized by the CJEU, notably 
the right to freedom of expression.6 
In the days following the CJEU’s decision, business executives and legal 
scholars alike were in an uproar over its potential ramifications.  Some 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Steven C. Bennett, The “Right To Be Forgotten”: Reconciling EU and US Perspectives, 
30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 161, 168 (2012). 
 2 See, e.g., Case C-101/01, Sweden v. Bodil Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. I-12992, I-13004-06 
(Nov. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Bodil Lindqvist], available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf. 
jsf?text=&docid=48382&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=1st&dir=&occ=first&part=1&ci
d=361596 (referring the following question to the CJEU: “Can the provisions of [Directive 
95/46], in a case such as the above, be regarded as bringing about a restriction which conflicts 
with the general principles of freedom of expression or other freedoms or rights. . . .”); Case 
C-524/06, Huber v. Germany, 2008 ECR I-09705, ¶ 40 (Dec. 16, 2008), available at http://eur 
-lex.europa.eu/legal-conent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:62006CJ0524&qid=14570405342 
05&from=EN (referring the following question to the CJEU: “Is the general processing of 
personal data of foreign citizens of the Union in a central register of foreign nationals 
compatible with . . . the requirement of necessity under Article 7(e) of Directive 95/46?”). 
 3 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEDP), Mario Costeja González, 2014 ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, ¶ 100(3) (May 13, 
2014) [hereinafter Google Spain], http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text 
=&docid=152065&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=1st&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=356
089. 
 4 David Lindsay, The ‘Right To Be Forgotten’ in European Data Protection Law, in 
EMERGING CHALLENGES IN PRIVACY LAW 290, 313 (Normann Witzleb et al. eds., 2014). 
 5 Google Spain, Case C-131/12, ¶ 100(3).  
 6 See generally David Drummond, Op-Ed., We Need to Talk About the Right To Be 
Forgotten, THE GUARDIAN (July 10, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/ 
jul/10/right-to-be-forgotten-european-ruling-google-debate. 
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argued that Google Spain was a blow to the freedom of expression and the 
right of the public to access information—both of which are expressly 
protected under Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (Charter).7  This Note addresses that criticism as well as the 
tension which exists between the right to be forgotten and the freedom of 
expression.  
Exploration of the scope of the right to be forgotten and its implications 
for internet search engine providers is critically important.  Despite the 
unprecedented nature of the case, the CJEU provided little guidance as to 
how to practically implement the right to be forgotten, and failed to clearly 
specify what kinds of companies would be affected.8  An analysis of the 
tension between the rights at issue is crucial to achieving greater clarity in 
EU law.  Courts, claimants, and the defendants of those claims will benefit 
from having more guidance about the parameters of the right to be forgotten 
and the grounds upon which such a claim can be raised.9 
This Note addresses the questions raised by Google Spain, and argues that 
a right to be forgotten can exist alongside the freedom of expression.  
Additionally, this Note argues that any balance between these two principles 
should be formulated in a way that provides clear legal guidance to those 
affected by the Google Spain decision.  Part I discusses the state of European 
privacy and data protection law leading up to the Google Spain decision.  
Part II then examines the tension between the right to be forgotten and the 
freedom of expression in comparison to similar tensions in EU law.  Lastly, 
Part III identifies the kind of data protection schemes that would resolve the 
questions raised by Google Spain, demonstrates that the right to be forgotten 
                                                                                                                   
 7 See, e.g., Roy Greenslade, Article 19’s Call to Google Over ‘Right To Be Forgotten’ 
Ruling, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/ 
oct/16/freedom-of-speech-google (discussing an advocacy group’s plea to Google to protect 
the freedom of expression despite the court’s decision in Google Spain); see also Drummond, 
supra note 6.  See generally Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 11, 
2012 O.J. (C 326) 391, 398 [hereinafter Charter]. 
 8 For example, some scholars and legal analysts have questioned whether companies like 
Facebook that have a search feature will be captured by the Google Spain decision.  See, e.g., 
Jeffrey Toobin, The Solace of Oblivion, NEW YORKER, Sept. 29, 2014, at 26, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29/solace-oblivion. 
 9 The CJEU failed to delineate what kinds of information individuals can have removed 
and whether the right would apply differently to public figures, leaving companies to adopt 
their own standards for when to grant a request.  See, e.g., Alistair Barr & Rolfe Winkler, 
Google Offers ‘Right To Be Forgotten’ Form in Europe, WALL ST. J., May 30, 2014, http:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/google-committee-of-experts-to-deal-with-right-to-be-forgotten-14014 
26748. 
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can exist alongside the freedom of expression in EU law, and provides useful 
guidance to those whose task it is to give effect to this right.  
II.  HISTORY OF PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION RIGHTS IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES 
The CJEU’s recognition of a right to be forgotten is unprecedented, but 
momentum towards this kind of privacy right was present well before the 
CJEU considered Google Spain.10  Exploration of the roots of data protection 
rights provides an important basis for understanding the complexity of and 
rationale behind a right to be forgotten.  In fact, developments in EU law and 
the law of its member states laid the foundation for the right to be forgotten 
as recognized in Google Spain.11 
A.  Data Protection Laws Before 1995 and the EU’s Data Protection 
Directive 
In the years following World War II, European societies developed an 
interest in the protection of privacy rights.12  European governments 
responded to this increased interest by proposing and enacting privacy laws 
within their countries.13  As inconsistencies between the various state laws 
arose, government officials and scholars called for harmonization across 
Europe.14 
The Council of Europe made an early attempt to harmonize the region’s 
privacy and data protection laws by enacting the Convention for the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data.15  This was the first legally binding data protection treaty to come into 
                                                                                                                   
 10 Lindsay, supra note 4, at 302–06 (describing the history of relevant privacy rights in EU 
member states). 
 11 See infra Part II.A–B (describing the history and development of EU and member state 
privacy and data protection law). 
 12 JACQUELINE KLOSEK, THE WAR ON PRIVACY 78 (2007) (“In the years following World 
War II, in light of the horrors raised by the holocaust, governments were sensitive to the 
importance of respecting their citizens’ right to maintain the privacy of certain personal 
information.”). 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id.  
 15 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data, Council of Europe, pmbl., opened for signature, Jan. 28, 1981, C.E.T.S. No. 
108 [hereinafter Convention]. 
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force in Europe.16  It guarantees an individual’s right to access any of his or 
her stored personal information.17  However, the Convention also includes a 
number of exceptions to that right.18  For example, it expressly states that a 
member state may derogate from certain treaty provisions when “such 
derogation is provided for by the law of the Party and constitutes a necessary 
measure,” or when personal data is used for statistics or scientific research 
with no risk of infringement on privacy.19  With its focus on the protection of 
individual privacy rights, the Convention paved the way for more extensive 
data protection initiatives, the most important being the EU’s 1995 Data 
Protection Directive.20 
Since the Convention entered into force, EU law has moved toward 
“put[ting] individuals in control of their own data and reinforc[ing] legal and 
practical certainty for economic operators and public authorities.”21  
Improvements upon existing technological capabilities and the development 
of an “information society” led to the enactment of the EU’s Directive on the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and 
on the Free Movement of Such Data (Data Protection Directive) in 1995.22  
Using the Convention as a starting point, the EU moved toward even greater 
harmonization and consistency between the data protection laws of its 
member states.23   
                                                                                                                   
 16 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data: Summary, http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/ 
full-list/-/conventions/treaty/108. 
 17 Convention, supra note 15, art. 8  
 18 Id. art. 9. 
 19 Id.  
 20 Lindsay, supra note 4, at 308. 
 21 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), at 2, COM (2012) 11 final 
(Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter General Data Protection Regulation], available at http://eur-lex.e 
uropa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012PC0011&from=en. 
 22 Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the 
Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 31–32 [hereinafter Data Protection 
Directive], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31 
995L0046&qid=1456693976267&from=EN. 
 23 Peter Hustinx, The Reform of EU Data Protection: Towards More Effective and More 
Consistent Data Protection Across the EU, in EMERGING CHALLENGES IN PRIVACY LAW 64 
(Normann Witzleb et al. eds., 2014) (noting that the European Commission was pushed to 
adopt the Data Protection Directive because of the need for greater harmonization and 
consistency among national laws than the Convention would facilitate). 
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In the Data Protection Directive, the European Commission 
(Commission), the EU’s independent executive body responsible for 
proposing and enforcing European legislation, announced two reasons for 
expanding the Union’s data protection framework.  First, it stated that the 
lack of harmony between European data protection laws would create 
obstacles for data transfers between countries.24  Second, the Commission 
noted that increased data protection was necessary to safeguard “fundamental 
rights and freedoms.”25  The Data Protection Directive sets forth standards 
that all states must meet and—within the confines of the Directive—provides 
states “considerable leeway” as to how those norms may be implemented.26  
While a right to be forgotten is not expressly mentioned in the Data 
Protection Directive, Articles 6, 12, and 14 all suggest that individuals have 
control over their personal information, and a general right to “erase” said 
information.  For example, Article 6(1) unequivocally provides that personal 
information may not be kept for any longer than necessary to fulfill the 
purpose for which the information was originally collected.27  This statement 
suggests companies may not treat an individual’s personal information like 
an ordinary consumer good—i.e., because the information relates to an 
individual, it may not be used indefinitely.  The Data Protection Directive’s 
prohibition on retaining information after a certain period of time also 
introduces the idea of collectors (such as search engine companies) engaging 
in data erasure, even if that is not the only means of complying with the 
law.28 
Article 12 of the Data Protection Directive makes a more direct reference 
to the erasure of data.29  This provision not only grants individuals the right 
to block the processing of any information that does not comply with the 
Directive’s requirements,30 but also provides the right to apply to have such 
                                                                                                                   
 24 Data Protection Directive, supra note 22, pmbl. 8. 
 25 Id. pmbl. 10.  
 26 Id. art. 5; CHRISTOPHER KUNER, EUROPEAN DATA PRIVACY LAW AND ONLINE BUSINESS 
29 (2003). 
 27 Data Protection Directive, supra note 22, art. 6(1)(e). 
 28 Lindsay, supra note 4, at 309 (noting the Data Protection Directive provides for the 
erasure of data in three distinct provisions, including one prohibiting the retention of collected 
data for no longer than necessary to achieve the purpose of a data collection initiative). 
 29 Data Protection Directive, supra note 22, art. 12.  
 30 Id. art. (a) (“Member States shall guarantee every data subject the right to obtain from the 
controller . . .as appropriate the . . . erasure or blocking of data the processing of which does 
not comply with the provisions of this Directive, in particular because of the incomplete or 
inaccurate nature of the data.”). 
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information erased.31  Article 12 thus represents a crucial step toward 
conferring individuals an express right to have their information erased. 
Lastly, Article 14 grants EU citizens the right to object to data processing 
and requires the controller to comply with valid objections.32  The 
Directive’s requirement that controllers cease processing data upon receiving 
successful objections is important because such language implies a qualified 
right of erasure.33  Thus, these provisions within the Data Protection 
Directive represent the precursor to the EU’s official recognition of a right to 
be forgotten.  
In 2012, the Commission proposed a major reform of the 1995 Data 
Protection Directive.34  In adopting this proposal—known as the General 
Data Protection Regulation or GDPR—the Commission noted that the Data 
Protection Directive, while sound in its objectives and principles, allowed for 
inconsistent implementation across member states.35  The 2012 GDPR was 
therefore touted as an opportunity for the EU to create a stronger and more 
cohesive data protection law.36  
Arguably, the most controversial reform in the GDPR was set forth in 
Article 17, which provides that individuals “shall have the right to obtain 
from the controller the erasure of personal data relating to them” provided 
that the individual can meet one of four grounds for erasure.37  The four 
grounds for erasure are: (1) “the data are no longer necessary in relation to 
the purposes for which they were collected,” (2) a person withdraws the 
consent that the processing was based on or the storage period consented to 
expired, (3) a person objects to the data processing pursuant to Article 19, 
                                                                                                                   
 31 Id. (stating individuals have the right to obtain from the data collector the “rectification, 
erasure or blocking of data” when appropriate).  This suggests that individuals may petition 
for the removal of data and said petition will be reviewed by the appropriate authority. 
 32 Id. art. 14(a) (“Where there is a justified objection, the processing instigated by the 
controller may no longer involve those data.”). 
 33 Lindsay, supra note 4, at 309–10.  See also Bert-Jaap Koops, Forgetting Footprints, 
Shunning Shadows: A Critical Analysis of the “Right to Be Forgotten” in Big Data Practice, 
SCRIPTED, Dec. 2011, at 229, 240, available at http://script-ed.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/ 
12/koops.pdf (noting that Article 14 of the Data Protection Directive allows individuals to 
invoke the right to be forgotten when the retention of the data would be harmful to the 
individual). 
 34 Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Commission Proposes a Comprehensive Reform of Data 
Protection Rules to Increase Users’ Control of Their Data and the Cut Costs for Business (Jan. 
25, 2012), available at http://Europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-46_en.htm?locale=en.  
 35 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 21, at 2. 
 36 Id.  
 37 Id. at 51. 
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and (4) the processing does not comply with the GDPR.38  In its explanatory 
memorandum on the GDPR, the Commission clarified that Article 17 
affirmatively provides EU citizens with a right to be forgotten and a right to 
erasure.39  The 2012 proposal is the first time the EU formally recognized the 
right of individuals to be “forgotten.”40  
Though some scholars viewed the GDPR as a welcome and necessary 
change, Article 17’s recognition of a right to be forgotten was highly 
controversial.41  Some argued that this right was an unprecedented form of 
online censorship, with others going so far as to claim that it represented the 
biggest threat to freedom of speech in recent years.42  Despite those critiques, 
the history of data protection laws in Europe represents the level of 
transnational interest in according greater privacy rights to personal 
information that makes its way onto the internet.  
B.  Data Protection Laws Within European Nations 
Recognition of a right to be forgotten also gained support from within the 
domestic laws of its member states.43 Many countries developed expansive 
                                                                                                                   
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 9.  
 40 Id.  
 41 For an example of support for the GDPR and the right to be forgotten, see John Hendel, 
Why Journalists Shouldn’t Fear Europe’s ‘Right to Be Forgotten,’ THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 25, 
2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/01/why-journalists-shouldnt-fear-
europes-right-to-be-forgotten/251955/2/.  
 42 See Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 88 (2012) 
(arguing that the right to be forgotten is “the biggest threat to free speech in the coming 
decade”); Jane Yakowitz, More Crap from the E.U., INFO/LAW BLOG (Jan. 25, 2012), http:// 
blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2012/01/25/more-crap-from-the-e-u/ (opining that the EU is 
engaging in “a misguided attack on the information economy”).  For a more recent expression 
of this argument, see Olivia Solon, EU ‘Right To Be Forgotten’ Ruling Paves Way for 
Censorship, WIRED.CO.UK (May 13, 2014), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-05/ 
13/right-to-be-forgotten-blog. 
 43 See GLORIA GONZÁLEZ FUSTER, The Surfacing of National Norms on Data Processing in 
Europe, in THE EMERGENCE OF PERSONAL DATA AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF THE EU 245–47 
(2014).  In some countries, the concept of a right to be forgotten emerged as a general right to 
data protection.  The French government conceived of this concept as a right to oblivion or 
droit à l’oubli numérique (right to digital forgetfulness).  Similarly, the Spanish government 
referred to this concept as a right to forget, or derecho al olvido.  In Italy, the right to be 
forgotten is most closely related to the right to oblivion, or dirrito all’ oblio.  Lindsay, supra 
note 4, at 302. 
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bodies of law around privacy rights and a right to be forgotten.44  In 
particular, this Note will focus on the efforts that took place in Germany and 
France45—both of which used a strong tradition of personality and privacy 
rights as the foundation for the development of the right to be forgotten.46  
The legal developments within these member states, along with 
developments in EU law, make plain the recognition of the right to be 
forgotten prior to the ECJ’s decision in Google Spain.  
1.  Data Protection Laws in Germany Prior to Google Spain 
Germany recognized an individual’s right to privacy and control over his 
or her personal information long before the Google Spain decision.  In 1973, 
the German Federal Constitutional Court expressly recognized that 
individuals have a fundamental right to determine how their personal 
information is used.47  Similarly, in 2003, Germany implemented legislation 
granting an implicit right to erase personal data processed in both the public 
and private sector.48  These steps toward broader personal privacy rights 
provide evidence of the recognition of the right to be forgotten at the national 
level. 
In Lebach I, the complainant argued the defendant television company 
infringed upon his right of personality when the company sought to 
broadcast a documentary about his conviction for robbery.49  Significantly, 
the documentary included the complainant’s name, photograph, and 
references to his sexual orientation.50   In overturning the lower court’s 
                                                                                                                   
 44 FUSTER, supra note 43, at 55–70 (noting the development of data protection and privacy 
laws in Germany, Sweden, France, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Portugal, Austria, and 
Spain in the 1970s and 1980s).  
 45 I consider the efforts in Germany and France to be most relevant since those countries are 
two of the most influential members of the EU. 
 46 Lindsay, supra note 4, at 302 (outlining the emergence of the right to be forgotten in 
France as originating from “three related, but conceptually and historically distinguished 
rights”). 
 47 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 1973, 35 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 202 (Ger.), translated in DONALD 
P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 479–83 (3d ed. 2012) [hereinafter Lebach I]. 
 48 Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG] [Federal Data Protection Act], 14 Jan. 2003, 
Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] at 66, § 1(1) (Ger.) [hereinafter Federal Data Protection Act], 
available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/BDSG.htm. 
 49 Lebach I, supra note 47, at 479–80.  
 50 Id. at 480. 
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decision to allow the documentary to air, the Federal Constitutional Court 
noted, “[i]n principle, everyone has the right to determine for him- or herself 
whether and to what extent others may make public an account of either 
certain like incidents or one’s entire life story.”51  With that statement, the 
court acknowledged that individuals have a right to control their personal 
information, and thus have a right to exclude others from access to said 
information. 
The Federal Constitutional Court went on to explicitly establish limits on 
the right of self-determination.52  The court reasoned that since both a right to 
self-determination and a right to access information were included in 
German constitutional law, neither held precedence over the other.53  
However, the court acknowledged that under certain circumstances the right 
to privacy trumps any public information rights.54  Nevertheless, the fact that 
the documentary’s subject matter was no longer current information and that 
it could have the effect of limiting the complainant’s reintegration into 
society persuaded the court to rule in the complainant’s favor.55  
Germany’s legislative branch took up the crusade toward greater privacy 
rights as well. Recognition of an individual’s right to control personal data 
was reinforced by the national government’s passage of the Act on 
Protection against Misuse of Personal Data in Data Processing (Federal 
Data Protection Act).56  The Act—which focused on data processing in both 
the public and private sector—noted that its purpose was “to protect the 
individual against his right to privacy being impaired through the handling of 
his personal data.”57  The 1997 version of the Federal Data Protection Act 
stipulated that the processing of personal data was forbidden unless 
authorized by another provision in the Act, or consented to by the individual 
whose data was being processed.58  As these examples show, the German 
legal system has given individuals an express right to control their 
information, and an implicit right to erase personal information by 
withdrawing consent to its collection.  
                                                                                                                   
 51 Id.  
 52 Id. at 480–81 (explaining the scope of limits on that right for private individuals).  
 53 Id. at 481. 
 54 Id. at 481–82.  
 55 Id. at 483. 
 56 Federal Data Protection Act, supra note 48. 
 57 Id. 
 58 FUSTER, supra note 43, at 60. 
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2.  Data Protection Laws in France Prior to Google Spain 
Lawmakers in France also used legislative acts to recognize data 
protection rights.  In 1978, the National Assembly (Assemblée Nationale) 
adopted the Act on Information Technology, Data Files and Civil Liberties.59  
The law included, among other provisions, a right to refuse the processing of 
data.60  Under this law, individuals who provided proof of identity could 
request that the data controller “rectify, complete, update, block, or delete” 
any personal information that was inaccurate or expired.61  The French 
government’s assertion that individuals can request the deletion of personal 
information in certain circumstances suggests that it supports the right of 
erasure. 
The French and German experiences evidence the recognition of 
personality rights in the collection, storage, and (in some cases) erasure of 
data at the national level.  Moreover, these experiences illustrate that member 
states have not only contemplated the tension between privacy rights and the 
freedom of expression, but have concluded that these rights can coexist.  
This conclusion, in conjunction with the previously outlined examples of 
Community-wide legislation, set the stage for the CJEU’s recognition of the 
right to be forgotten in Google Spain.  
C.  Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
In Google Spain, the CJEU held that search engine operators must 
remove links to webpages displayed following the search of an individual’s 
name that are “inadequate, irrelevant, or no longer relevant, or excessive in 
relation to the purposes of the processing at issue.”62  This remains true even 
when the information has been published lawfully and is factually correct.63  
Although the CJEU’s decision was unprecedented, it was not wholly 
unexpected.  No EU law formally extended a right to be forgotten, however, 
the culmination of legal developments that had resulted since the passage of 
                                                                                                                   
 59 Loi 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés [Law 
78-17 of January 6, 1978 on Information Technology, Data Files, and Civil Liberties], 
Commission Nationale de L’informatique et des Libertés [CNIL] [National Commission on 
Informatics and Liberty], Aug. 6, 2004 [hereinafter French Data Protection Law], available at 
http://www.legilsationline.org/documents/id/744. 
 60 Id. arts. 38, 40.  
 61 Id. art. 40 (emphasis added). 
 62 Google Spain, Case C-131/12, ¶ 94. 
 63 Id.  
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the Convention certainly signaled the evolution of the right.  Moreover, the 
increasing number of complaints against search engine companies and calls 
for an official recognition of a right to be forgotten illustrate this point.64  
On March 5, 2010, Mr. Costeja-González filed a complaint with the 
Spanish Data Protection Agency over search results related to a repossession 
of his home in 1998.65  Prior to filing a complaint, Mr. Costeja-González 
attempted to have Google remove the information, arguing that the news 
stories were outdated because the debt owed on the home had been paid and 
the home sold.66  When Google’s formal complaint process failed to provide 
a remedy, Costeja-González filed his complaint with Spanish authorities.67  
He requested, among other things, that Google Spain or Google, Inc. be 
required to remove or conceal the news stories so that they no longer 
appeared in search results.68  The Spanish Data Protection Agency honored 
Consteja-González’s request.69  Google Spain and Google, Inc. appealed the 
Agency’s decision to the Spanish National High Court, the Audiencia 
Nacional, and that court referred the decision to the CJEU.70 
To determine whether Mr. Consteja-Gonzalez had a right to remove the 
links, the CJEU evaluated the scope of the 1995 Data Protection Directive.71  
Ultimately, the CJEU reached three important conclusions regarding 
Google’s duty to erase personal information and the right to be forgotten.  
First, the CJEU found that search engines engage in the processing of 
personal data, and are therefore “controllers” within the meaning of Article 
2(b) and (d).72  Next, the CJEU concluded that Articles 12(b) and 14 should 
be interpreted to mean that search engine operators, such as Google, are 
required to remove links to web pages that are displayed following a search 
of an individual’s name at the request of that individual.73  Finally, the CJEU 
held that the right to have personal information removed is limited74—a 
                                                                                                                   
 64 See generally Kashmir Hill, Plastic Surgeon’s Legal Quest to Facelift Google Search 
Results, FORBES, Mar. 7, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/03/07/plastic-su 
rgeons-legal-quest-to-facelift-google-search-results/.  
 65 Google Spain, Case C-131/12, ¶ 14. 
 66 The Man Who Sued Google to Be Forgotten, NEWSWEEK, May 30, 2014, available at 
http://www.newsweek.com/man-who-sued-google-be-forgotten-252854. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Google Spain, Case C-131/12, ¶ 15. 
 69 Id. ¶ 17.  
 70 Id. ¶¶ 18, 20. 
 71 Id. ¶ 20 (describing the legal issues the CJEU address in this case). 
 72 Id. ¶ 100(1). 
 73 Id. ¶ 100(3). 
 74 Id. ¶ 100(4). 
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complainant must establish that he or she has a right to have the information 
removed, and demonstrate that there is not a “preponderant interest of the 
general public” in accessing the information.75  Though the court briefly 
addressed the scope of this newly defined right, it left room for further 
discussion and interpretation regarding how the right would fit into the 
greater context of EU law.76  
III.  TENSION BETWEEN A RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN AND FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION 
Generally, both the CJEU and scholars agree that balance is needed 
between the right to be forgotten and the freedom of expression.77  What is 
undecided is how much weight one right should carry in relation to the other, 
and who should conduct the balancing.  This section addresses those 
lingering questions following the CJEU’s Google Spain decision.  It begins 
by first defining the freedom of expression.  Next, this section clarifies 
exactly where the points of tension between the freedom of expression and 
the right to be forgotten lie.  Lastly, this section offers an analysis of the 
varying ways the CJEU can strike a balance between the rights at issue.  In 
so doing, it offers a critique of each method, and ultimately points out the 
kinds of questions the CJEU should be weary of as it interprets the rule set 
out in Google Spain in the future.  
A.  Defining the Freedom of Expression 
Despite its strict adherence to notions of individual privacy rights, the EU 
has expressly recognized that individuals have a fundamental right to free 
expression.78  According to the CJEU, the freedom of expression includes the 
expression of opinions and the freedom to receive and impart information.79  
Additionally, the court has cited with approval decisions from the European 
Court of Human Rights holding that the freedom of expression is applicable 
                                                                                                                   
 75 Id.  
 76 See supra note 8 (describing one question left open by the Google Spain decision). 
 77 See, e.g., Google Spain, Case C-131/12, ¶ 85 (discussing the conflict between an 
individual’s right to privacy, a journalist or publisher’s freedom of expression, and how 
Article 9 of the Data Protection Directive balances that conflict). 
 78 Charter, art. 11, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 391, 398. 
 79 Case C-73/07, Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy, 2008 E.C.R. I-
9831, ¶ 39 (May 8, 2008) [hereinafter Satakunnan Markkinapörssi], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62007CJ0073. 
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to both information that offends or shocks the state, and information that is 
favorably received.80  As the newer rule, tradition dictates that the right to be 
forgotten should be altered as necessary to fit into the previously established 
framework of Community law with respect to the freedom of expression.81  
B.  Points of Tension Between Freedom of Expression and the Right to Be 
Forgotten 
Some scholars and business executives have opposed the recognition of a 
right to be forgotten, claiming it is an imposition into free expression rights 
and amounts to censorship.82  To place these criticisms in perspective, it is 
necessary to examine the specific points at which the right to be forgotten 
creates tension with the freedom of expression.  
1.  Tension Between Public Access to Information and Individual Privacy 
Rights 
The language used in Google Spain illuminates the first point of tension 
between the rights at issue—the tension between public access to 
information versus individual privacy.83  The CJEU specifically noted that a 
right to be forgotten cannot exist without balancing other relevant interests 
like the freedom of expression.84  In other words, neither right takes absolute 
precedence over the other.  
In some cases, the CJEU has determined that it is reasonable to allow free 
access to information.85  This is especially true when the information is used 
for journalistic purposes.86  However, acceptance of this form of expression 
conflicts with the CJEU’s proposition that an individual’s interest in 
removing personal data outweighs the public’s interest in accessing his or her 
information; even if said information has been lawfully published and is 
                                                                                                                   
 80 Id. 
 81 Miguel Pojares Maduro, Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context 
of Constitutional Pluralism, 1 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 138, 146 (2007) (describing the CJEU’s 
adherence to a “precedent oriented” approach that defers to a well-established line of case 
law). 
 82 Rosen, supra note 42; Yakowitz, supra note 42.  
 83 Google Spain, Case C-131/12, § 14. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. ¶ 97.  
 86 See id. ¶ 85.  
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true.87  Accordingly, personal data included in internet search results that 
falls within the provisions of the Data Protection Directive provides an 
individual with a prevailing right of removal.88 
The CJEU’s convicting recognition of these counter vailing positions 
leads to the conclusion that the relevant compelling interest—public or 
private—depends on the facts of given case.  There is arguably some social 
utility in allowing one right to trump the other in cases where access to 
information is justified by a compelling public interest, or where the interests 
of the individual prevail.  Nevertheless, since one right cannot always trump 
the other, these competing justifications necessarily result in tension between 
the right to be forgotten and the right to freedom of expression.  
2.  Tension Between Access to Information for Research and Government 
Authority to Regulate Access 
A second point of tension results from the conflict between data 
collection for journalistic and public research purposes, and the state’s right 
to regulate data collection for the protection of individuals.  In Google Spain, 
the CJEU concluded the Data Protection Directive required search engine 
operators to remove unwanted links to sites with information relating to a 
person that appear after a search of their name.89  Moreover, the court further 
held that in cases where a legitimate right to removal is found, that right 
overrides “the interest of the general public in finding that information upon 
a search relating to the [individual’s] name.”90 
Such language is in obvious tension with the right to freedom of 
expression granted in Article 11 of the Charter.91  Although the Charter also 
protects an individual’s personal data, it does not do so at the expense of the 
freedom of expression, and does not purport to hold one right in greater 
importance over the other.92  Since the decision of the CJEU upholds the 
right to be forgotten at the expense of—in some cases—the freedom of 
                                                                                                                   
 87 See id. ¶¶ 94, 97.   
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. ¶ 100(3).  
 90 Id. ¶ 97. 
 91 Id. (indicating that there are situations, like when a public figure is involved, when the 
interest of the public will outweigh the right of erasure). 
 92 Charter, art. 8(1), 2012 O.J. (C 326) 391, 397 (“Everyone has the right to the protection 
of personal data concerning him or her.”). 
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expression and information, it is in tension with the plain language of the 
Charter.93 
C.  Addressing the Tension Between Privacy Rights and Freedom of 
Expression  
Despite the tension between the right to be forgotten and the freedom of 
expression, it is possible for these rights to coexist within the EU’s body of 
law.  Perhaps the easiest way to demonstrate how these rights can coexist is 
with a few hypothetical scenarios.  First, imagine a news article about a 
prominent politician’s former membership in an unpopular social group 
surfaces in an internet search of his name.  The politician faces public 
backlash for his prior membership in the group, and seeks to invoke the right 
to be forgotten under Google Spain.  
Second, imagine photographs of a university student consuming alcohol 
at a social event are posted on the internet.  Years later, when the student is 
applying for work, she finds that a link to the photographs is one of the first 
results displayed upon a Google search of her name. 
Lastly, imagine that a private restaurant owner finds that negative reviews 
of his business are displayed when his name is entered into Google’s search 
bar.  Would the Google Spain decision require links to this personal 
information be removed?  This section attempts to answer this question using 
the balancing tests suggested by prior ECJ case law and EU scholars.  
1.  ECJ Case Law and Proposals for Balancing: Reasoning by Analogy  
One approach to easing the clash between the right to be forgotten and the 
freedom of expression is to look to tensions between similar rights and the 
way in which the CJEU has resolved them. The CJEU has analyzed conflicts 
between individual privacy rights and the right of the public to access 
information on many occasions.  Exploring those decisions may aid in 
understanding how the rights at issue in Google Spain can coexist.  
For example, in previous cases the CJEU attempted to set guidelines for 
balancing privacy and free expression rights.94  In Bodil Lindqvist, the CJEU 
                                                                                                                   
 93 Google’s Chief Legal Officer, David Drummond, appeared to share this view when he 
commented that Google’s decisions on what links to remove are based on the international 
community’s understanding that everyone has a right to freedom of expression.  Drummond, 
supra note 6. 
 94 See Bodil Lindqvist, Case-101/01; Satakunnan Markkinaporssi, Case C-73/07. 
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noted that standards for balancing competing interests are contained in the 
Data Protection Directive.95  In particular, the Directive provides rules for 
when the processing of personal information is allowed, and requires 
safeguards be implemented to protect the public.96  Specifically, Article 9 
includes a derogation clause that allows states to impose exceptions to some 
provisions of the Directive when the processing of personal information is 
carried out for journalistic, artistic, or literary purposes, and only when 
derogation is necessary to reconcile a right to privacy with the freedom of 
expression.97  Similarly, Article 13 provides that states may adopt legislation 
to restrict the scope of some of the Directive’s provisions when doing so is 
necessary for “the protection of the data subject or the rights and freedoms of 
others.”98  In addition, the CJEU also offered its own guidelines for 
balancing privacy and freedom of expression rights.  It held that while the 
member states have some autonomy to weigh personal privacy rights against 
the freedom of expression, they should be diligent in ensuring the balance 
comports with “the fundamental rights protected by the Community legal 
order or with the other general principles of Community law.”99 
The same logic can be applied to the right to be forgotten.  Turning to the 
hypothetical cases, the political figure would face some difficulty in 
removing search results about his former membership in an unpopular group 
because Google would argue those results were included for journalistic 
purposes.  The politician is a public figure, and as such, the public has a 
greater interest in his personal life.  The balance of interests in this case 
would thus likely fall in favor of the search engine because the public interest 
would outweigh the politician’s right to privacy.  In contrast, the university 
student might have more luck under the standard set forth in Bodil Lindqvist, 
because the inclusion of links to otherwise social photographs does not 
appear to fulfill a journalistic, artistic, or literary purpose. 
By adding a provision to derogate under circumstances similar to those 
recognized in Articles 9 and 13 of the Data Protection Directive, the CJEU 
would create a space wherein member states could make their own decisions 
regarding which right should carry more weight.  For reasons discussed 
below, that may not be the best solution.  However, adherence to the CJEU’s 
additional requirement that any balancing comport with the EU’s 
                                                                                                                   
 95 Bodil Lindqvist, Case C-101/01, ¶ 82. 
 96 Id. ¶¶ 82–90. 
 97 Data Protection Directive, supra note 22, art. 9.  
 98 Id. art. 13(1)(g).  
 99 Bodil Lindqvist, Case C-101/01, ¶ 87. 
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fundamental rights would make it clear that one right will not always take 
precedence over the other, and that they can coexist. 
In Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy, the court also 
suggested guidelines for balancing fundamental interests.100  There, the 
CJEU noted that both individual privacy rights and the freedom of 
expression can be restricted, provided that any imposed limitations are laid 
down by law, meet the aims of protection of fundamental rights, and are 
necessary for a democratic society.101  As was the case with the standard set 
forth in Bodil Lindqvist, the outcome of the hypothetical complainants’ cases 
might vary depending on where the case was brought, and that member 
state’s interpretation of each of the aforementioned factors.  
The balancing methods employed by the CJEU in these prior cases 
provide member states with some guidance, but lack clear direction with 
respect to application.  Although the CJEU believes a lack of specificity is 
necessary,102 some consistency in the standard used to conduct a balancing 
test would likely accommodate the EU’s repeated concern regarding the 
harmonization of data protection laws throughout the Community.103  
Moreover, the ambiguity surrounding the CJEU’s decisions interpreting the 
guidelines set forth in the Data Protection Directive allows member states to 
make their own value judgments about which right—the right to be forgotten 
or the freedom of expression—should be prioritized.  As a result, decisions 
regarding what is necessary for a democratic society, or needed for 
journalistic, artistic, or literary purposes could vary widely across member 
states.   Thus, under the aforementioned hypothetical cases, one state might 
decide that links to the news article about the politician are not necessary for 
journalistic purposes, while another might reach the opposite conclusion.  
Such flexibility invites unnecessary confusion into the law, and therefore 
does not fully resolve the problem resulting from Google Spain.104  
                                                                                                                   
 100 Satakunnan Markkinaporssi, Case C-73/07, ¶¶ 55–56.  
 101 Id. The language used by the court here is similar to the limiting language placed on the 
right to privacy found in Article 8(2) of the European Convention on the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.  See Convention, supra note 15, art. 8(2).  
 102 Bodil Lindqvist, Case C-101/01, ¶ 83 (“As regards Directive 95/46 itself, its provisions 
are necessarily relatively general since it has to be applied to a large number of very different 
situations.”). 
 103 See, e.g., Data Protection Directive, supra note 22, pmbl. 1 (listing “common action” and 
the “elimination of barriers” as objectives of the EU); Bodil Lindqvist, Case C-101/01, ¶ 79. 
 104 Allowing member states to use general guidelines in making the ultimate decision 
regarding balancing of such fundamental rights is unlikely to lead to greater harmony in data 
protection laws across the EU.  In fact, it was a lack of harmony in data protection and privacy 
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2.  Allowing the Member States to Strike a Balance 
The CJEU has said that it is up to the member states to resolve tensions 
between fundamental rights when the Data Protection Directive fails to 
provide clear guidance.  In Institut professionnel des agents immobiliers 
(IPI) v. Englebert, the court held that Article 13 of the Data Protection 
Directive grants member states the freedom to decide what legislative 
measures they will take to address limits to a private individual’s right to 
information.105  In other words, the court held that the EU Parliament 
intended for the member states to exercise discretion over limits to the 
individual right to control data. 
The CJEU also endorsed state execution of a balancing test in early cases 
like Bodil Lindqvist and Satakunnan Markkinapörssi.  In Bodil Lindqvist, the 
CJEU held that mechanisms for balancing the rights at issue are derived from 
the “adoption, by the Member States, of national provisions implementing 
that directive.”106  That rule was upheld some five years later in Satakunnan 
Markkinapörssi, where the CJEU stated that when striking a balance between 
rights, member states should be accorded broad discretion to apply their own 
traditions and social values.107  Based on the information available, member 
state balancing appears to be an appropriate solution to the dilemma 
                                                                                                                   
laws that prompted the EU to not only adopt the Data Protective Directive, but also consider 
amendments to that agreement: 
The current framework remains sound as far as its objectives and principles 
are concerned, but it has not prevented fragmentation in the way personal 
data protection is implemented across the Union, legal uncertainty and a 
widespread public perception that there are significant risks associated 
notably with online activity.  This is why it is time to build a stronger and 
more coherent data protection framework in the EU, backed by strong 
enforcement that will allow the digital economy to develop across the internal 
market, put individuals in control of their own data and reinforce legal and 
practical certainty for economic operators and public authorities. 
General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 21, at 2. 
 105 Case C-473/12, Institut professionnel de agents immobiliers (IPI) v. Englebert ¶ 42 (Nov. 
7, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=144217&pageInde 
x=0&doclang=en&mode=1st&dir=&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=383795 (“[Article 13] does 
not oblige the Member States to lay down in their national law exceptions for the purposes 
listed in Article 13(1)(a) to (g) but, on the contrary, the legislature intended to give them the 
freedom to decide whether, and if so for what purposes, they wish to take legislative measures 
aimed at limiting, inter alia, the extent of the obligations to inform the [individual whose data 
was collected].”). 
 106 Bodil Lindquist, Case C-101/01, ¶ 82. 
 107 Satakunnan Markkinaporssi, Case C-73/07, ¶ 53. 
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presented by the right to be forgotten.  Nonetheless, the benefits of adopting 
this option are outweighed by the problems it presents. 
While a member state balancing approach has the benefit of simplicity, it 
comes at the expense of consistency.  The hypothetical case about the 
restaurant owner illustrates the problem.  A country like Germany—which 
has traditionally upheld the right of individuals to make decisions regarding 
their personality—might find that the restaurant owner has a right to have the 
undesirable links removed because he is not a public figure, and therefore 
has the right to make decisions about how his image is used.108  Under 
French law, however, the same restaurant owner might not be afforded the 
same protection since French courts have held that an individual can request 
that data processing cease only in certain circumstances, like when the 
information is inaccurate or expired.109  
Like the Directive-based method, allowing member states to take control 
of balancing the competing rights will not lead to the harmonization in law 
that the EU prefers.110  The uncertainty such a standard presents is 
particularly harmful for those search engine companies that operate within 
multiple member states.  Those companies would likely have a difficult time 
adjusting to different standards with respect to data protection laws.111  
Conversely, consistency in the data protection laws of each member state 
would better facilitate the sharing of information across state lines.  Search 
engine operators would not have to look to dozens of different rules before 
providing links to information published online.  The CJEU has previously 
concluded that allowing member states to engage in the balancing of rights 
did not create issues of “predictability” or consistency,112 however, the lack 
of clear standards for broader harmonization of data protection laws among 
individual member states renders it nearly impossible to avoid such 
uncertainty.  
Although the balancing tests employed by the CJEU in previous data 
protection cases have their shortcomings, they are illustrative of the kinds of 
considerations the court should apply to the right to be forgotten in the 
future.  For example, from the Directive–based method, search engine 
                                                                                                                   
 108 See Lebach I, supra note 47, at 479–80. 
 109 French Data Protection Law, supra note 59, art. 40. 
 110 See supra notes 103, 105 and accompanying text.  
 111 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 21, at 1–2 (noting the lack of a 
comprehensive approach to personal data protection in the EU “risks slowing down the 
development of innovative uses of new technologies”). 
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companies and courts learn the kind of factors for balancing that exist under 
EU law.  Similarly, from the individual application method, courts and 
companies learn that questions of balancing may require consideration of the 
policies of each member state.  These considerations provide a basic 
foundation upon which the CJEU might build a more expansive or applicable 
test for the right to be forgotten. 
3.  Scholarly Opinions on Balancing the Rights at Issue  
Scholarly opinions provide another source for balancing the right to be 
forgotten and the freedom of expression.  For example, Advocate General 
Niilo Jääskinen believes that “the fundamental right to information merits 
particular protection in EU law.”113  He then cautions against any method 
that places a duty to balance competing private and public interests in the 
hands of internet search engines.114  Jääskinen argues that allowing search 
engine companies to create an applicable test would likely lead to the 
companies being inundated with removal requests, the automatic withdrawal 
of any objected content, and the disregard of the interests of the original 
publishers of the information.115  Moreover, he also argues that this method 
would inevitably result in censorship by the search engine operators.116  
Notably, however, the Advocate General does not mention who should 
shoulder the burden of creating and applying a test for balancing the 
competing interests.  
Some EU scholars note that provisions in the GDPR suggest a way to 
accommodate the interests of private persons and the countervailing interests 
of the public.117  The GDPR—a reform proposal for the Data Protection 
Directive—provides that a right to be forgotten can be limited when 
exceptions are necessary for journalistic, artistic, or literary expression, for 
protecting the public interest in public health, or for historical, statistical, or 
scientific research purposes.118  The GDPR’s methods for choosing between 
                                                                                                                   
 113 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia 
Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) ¶ 107, 121 (May 13, 2014) [hereinafter Opinion of 
Advocate General Jääskinen], http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=138 
782&doclang=EN.  It is important to note that the opinions of Advocate Generals are written 
independently of the CJEU judgments on cases and are not binding.  
 114 Id. ¶ 133. 
 115 Id. ¶¶ 133–134. 
 116 Id. ¶ 134. 
 117 Lindsay, supra note 4, at 290–91. 
 118 General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 21, at 52, art. 17(3). 
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competing rights differ from those employed by other EU instruments on 
data protection by allowing for derogation from the right to be forgotten for 
research purposes and public health.119  Other scholars suggest that the 
ability to derogate from a right to be forgotten should extend to all forms of 
expression, not just creative or journalistic expression.120  However, such a 
method for balancing competing rights goes beyond anything currently 
endorsed by the CJEU or the Data Protection Directive. 
Given these suggestions by EU scholars, how would the hypothetical 
cases be decided?  In the case of the politician who wants to remove search 
links to a news article, scholarly opinions suggest that his request should not 
be honored.  Though he has an interest in privacy under GDPR Article 52—
particularly if the information is outdated—it would likely be argued that 
there is some journalistic purpose that warrants keeping the links.  
Conversely, the balance between the freedom of expression and the right to 
be forgotten seems to tip in the other direction in the case of the student.  The 
journalistic, artistic, or public health purpose of the photos seems minimal, if 
not nonexistent.  Thus, the student may have good cause for arguing that 
limiting free expression here is necessary in order to protect her rights and 
freedoms.  Lastly, in the case of the restaurant owner, it might be argued that 
there is some journalistic purpose in allowing links to the bad reviews to 
continue being displayed in search results.  There may even be some public 
health purpose for the continued display of the links if they alleged 
unsanitary conditions in the restaurant.  In this last case, the balance shifts 
once more toward the right to freedom of expression and allowing the links 
to remain active.  
The methods suggested by scholars and the above hypothetical analysis 
support an argument that the rights at issue can coexist within EU law.  As 
Advocate General Jääskinen noted, the right to free expression is highly 
valued in the EU.121  Individual rights to privacy are also valued.  In an 
attempt to find a balance between those rights, the drafters of the Charter on 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union provided a framework for 
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 120 Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Draft Report on the Proposal for 
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals 
with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, at 
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adjudication under Article 52.122  Similarly, Article 9 of the Data Protection 
Directive offers some guidance as to how to balance the rights at issue.  
Thus, two separate documents have contemplated the tension between 
privacy rights and freedom of information.  However, neither EU scholars 
nor the CJEU consider the tension to be so dispositive as to require that one 
right always be upheld over the other.  The insistence of EU bodies and 
scholars on striking a balance between a right to be forgotten and the 
freedom of expression shows that these rights can coexist. 
IV.  WAYS A RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION CAN 
COEXIST 
The CJEU’s failure to provide substantive guidelines in its Google Spain 
decision left open questions of how a right to be forgotten should be 
balanced against an existing freedom of expression, who should do the 
balancing, and on what grounds such a claim may be raised.  Using the 
aforementioned hypothetical situations as a guide, this Note offers 
suggestions for how those questions may be answered.  
A.  Easing Tension by Stating When a State May Derogate from a Right to 
Be Forgotten 
To ease the tension between the rights at issue, it is critical that the CJEU 
delineate with greater detail when a state may derogate from the right to be 
forgotten.  Despite acknowledging the need to conduct a balancing inquiry 
between the rights at issue, the CJEU went on to conclude that such a 
balance “may however depend, in specific cases, on the nature of the 
information in question and its sensitivity for the data subject’s private life 
and on the interest of the public in having that information.”123  
Unfortunately, the court failed to adequately explain the parameters of the 
public interest exception.  Instead, it merely noted that an individual’s role in 
public life would be a consideration in assessing whether the exception 
would apply.124  Indeed, it would be easier to determine which right will hold 
more weight in a given context if the CJEU specifically stated what kinds of 
information fall under the broad heading of “public interest.”  
                                                                                                                   
 122 Charter, art. 52, 2012 O.J. (C326) 406, 407 (detailing the process for determining how to 
properly interpret, apply, and prioritize the rights provided for by the Charter). 
 123 Google Spain, Case C-131/12, ¶ 81 (emphasis added). 
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Using the language included in the Data Protection Directive would be 
one way the CJEU could expand upon its public interest exception.  As 
previously stated, Article 9 allows member states to derogate from the 
Directive’s provisions when information is processed for artistic, literary, 
and journalistic purposes.125  This Article provides a means by which states 
can limit an individual’s freedom of privacy when doing so is necessary to 
protect the freedom of expression.126  The CJEU could adopt a similar 
position in the context of the right to be forgotten, and hold that individuals 
do not have a right of removal when that information exists for certain 
specified purposes.  
For example, the CJEU could stipulate that when information is collected 
for journalistic reasons, a removal request would be considered under a 
stricter standard of review.  Nevertheless, such a standard would inevitably 
require courts to further expand upon the true meaning “journalistic 
purpose”—a heavy burden in a time when it is difficult to draw a line 
between journalism and information simply published on a blog.  Although 
the Data Protection Directive does not contain language defining the term, 
the GDPR may provide some helpful insight into how the courts could 
interpret what constitutes a journalistic purpose.  The GDPR’s Explanatory 
Memorandum describes journalistic purpose as those activities engaged in 
for “the disclosure to the public of information, opinions or ideas, 
irrespective of the medium which is used to transmit them.”127  Even with 
that description, the problem of defining journalistic purpose is a massive 
undertaking CJEU must face.128 
Furthermore, while the journalistic purpose standard found in the Data 
Protection Directive may provide one avenue for expounding upon the public 
interest exception, the CJEU would still have to determine if it is the best 
test.  On the one hand, this journalistic purpose test would answer some 
questions left open by Google Spain.  For example, a test of this nature may 
show when the right to be forgotten can be invoked, and further provide an 
additional standard by which both search engine companies and member 
states can measure whether a removal request should be honored.  In 
addition, it differs from the public interest standard employed by the CJEU in 
that it takes into consideration the interest of a particular group, the 
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journalism profession.  Finally, in considering whether the information was 
collected with a journalistic purpose, the court would be adhering to the free 
expression rights included in Article 11 of the Charter.  If the CJEU is 
interested in finding a balance between the rights at issue, this journalistic 
purpose test—to the extent the court can overcome the definition problem 
noted above—would be a pivotal first step in that direction.  
On the other hand, a journalistic purpose test could be subject to the same 
criticism as the general ‘in the public interest’ standard.  In some ways, 
stating that the balance sways towards freedom of expression when the 
information was collected for journalistic purposes is just as illusory as the 
existing standard.  Arguably, any piece of information could be said to have 
been collected for a journalistic purpose.  Despite this fact, a journalistic 
purpose standard coupled with an ‘in the public interest’ standard would 
provide more guidance to search engine companies and the member states 
than either standard on its own.  
Alternatively, the CJEU could adhere to the public interest standard it set 
out and look to prior case law to better explain what kind of information is in 
the public interest.  Providing greater detail about what constitutes the public 
interest would also help to settle how to balance the right to be forgotten and 
the freedom of expression in certain circumstances.  For example, in 
Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy, the CJEU explained 
in great detail what constitutes the public interest.129  That language could 
easily be applied to the right to be forgotten.  In that case the court stated 
“public interest arises in any case where the information communicated 
relates to a public debate which is actually being conducted.”130  The court 
further held that certain topics are by their nature matters of public interest.131  
Those topics include information from public hearings, transparency of 
political life, and “information on the ideas and attitudes, as well as the 
conduct, of prominent politicians.”132  Lastly, the CJEU noted that certain 
kinds of information are not matters of public interest.  Specifically, 
information about an individual’s private life that has no connection with the 
person’s public life or does not contribute to any debate of general interest to 
society is not within the public interest.133  Ultimately, the court concluded 
                                                                                                                   
 129 Satakunnan Markkinapörssi, Case C-73/07, ¶¶ 71–74. 
 130 Id. ¶ 73. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. ¶ 74. 
2015] RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN  191 
 
 
the test for public interest should be whether an individual has a “legitimate 
expectation of respect for his or her private life.”134 
The CJEU’s explanation of what does and does not constitute the public 
interest—when combined with other tests—would likely provide some 
standard for balancing the rights at issue.  That conclusion can be drawn by 
returning to the hypothetical cases of the politician, student, and restaurant 
owner.  In the case of the politician, the links may not have to be removed, 
since they arguably include information concerning the ideas and attitudes of 
a prominent politician.  The restaurant owner too would not fare well under 
this public interest test—the links to the reviews relate to his public life, and 
arguably contribute to a debate of general public interest.  The student would 
likely have the best outcome under this proposed public interest standard.  
Even if the photos were posted for some journalistic purpose, the student is 
not a public person and arguably has a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
this context.  Additionally, links to the photos do not contribute to an issue 
that is of general public interest.  
At the very least, by adopting this standard and combining it with other 
tests, the court could provide individuals with more information about what 
constitutes the public interest.  In addition EU citizens would be able to 
predict with greater certainty whether a search engine company is obligated 
to honor their request for removal.  That would be an important step towards 
resolving the questions left open by Google Spain.  
B.  Easing Tension by Providing Clear Standards for Honoring the Right to 
Be Forgotten Requests 
The second step towards harmonizing the right to be forgotten with the 
existing right of free expression would be to provide clearer standards for 
when companies must honor individuals’ removal requests.  In the wake of 
Google Spain, search engine companies have largely been left with the task 
of making determinations on removal requests.135  Throughout Google Spain, 
the court noted that information is no longer necessary when it appears “to be 
inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive.”136  However, the 
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EU’s Commissioner for Justice recognized that such standards are 
subjective.137  Those seeking to invoke the right to be forgotten and the 
search engine companies charged with honoring their requests may have 
different opinions on when the adequacy, relevance, and accuracy 
requirements are met.  As such, more uniform standards are needed to inform 
individuals of exactly when their rights can be invoked. 
C.  Easing Tension by Adopting Standards Currently Used by Data 
Processing Companies 
In seeking to adopt more uniform standards for right to be forgotten 
requests, the CJEU could follow the approach Google has recently 
implemented.  Google has set up a separate website for individuals to supply 
their name, photo identification, and explanation for the deletion request.138  
Of the requests it has received, the company has removed links where the 
information involves nude photographs uploaded to the internet against the 
requester’s will, HIV diagnoses, and outdated political views.139  Among 
those deletion requests that have been refused are those that involve 
information regarding sex offender convictions, reports of violent crime 
(even when the individual was later acquitted), and patient reviews of 
doctors.140  From these initial removal requests, the EU can derive a standard 
for when requests to remove information will be honored. Turning to the 
hypothetical cases presented above, it becomes clear who could have their 
removal request honored under this last proposed test.  In the case of the 
politician—barring the considerations about his status as a public figure and 
journalistic purpose—he may be able to have the links removed because they 
represent outdated views.  The student too would be able to achieve her 
desired result since Google has granted similar requests.141  The 
restauranteur, however, would not be so lucky.  His case is very similar to a 
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context where a right to be forgotten request has not been honored—patient 
reviews of doctors.  
As a general rule, the CJEU could hold that people have a right to invoke 
the right to be forgotten when the information concerns solely private matters 
that have nothing to do with that individual’s public life.  Conversely, 
individuals would not have a right to delete links that involve matters that 
relate to his or her public life, or are of public concern.  Of course, such a 
crude distinction may raise the question of what constitutes the public 
interest, and overlap with the analysis the CJEU would have to consider in 
that regard.  Even so, this distinction would go a long way towards providing 
the public with a basic standard for understanding when their request would 
be honored.  More than this, it would provide a clearer understanding of what 
exactly the right to be forgotten entails.  
Any standard for clarifying the right to be forgotten and balancing that 
right with the existing freedom of expression will require much more 
analysis than provided here.  This right is new, and both the CJEU and 
search engine companies are on a long road towards identifying what aspects 
of the right work and which aspects require reform.  Until the CJEU moves 
to answer the questions left open by Google Spain, there will be some 
ambiguity in the law.  This Note provides some answers to those questions 
by stating that the right to be forgotten can coexist with freedom of 
expression norms, and by offering suggestions for how the CJEU might ease 
the tension between those rights.  Important questions of how the right to be 
forgotten should develop from here remain.  The ability of search engine 
companies, courts, and the general public to function effectively depends on 
the answers to those questions. 
  
 
